the authors proposed a new aggregate signature scheme referred to as multiple-TA (trusted authority) one-time identity-based aggregate signature (MTA-OTIBAS). Further, they gave a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme. We recall here the definition of MTA-OTIBAS and the concrete proposed scheme. Then we prove that our MTA-OTIBAS concrete scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the co-CDH problem assumption.
INTRODUCTION
In [3] we proposed a new aggregate signature scheme referred to as multiple-TA (trusted authority) one-time identity-based aggregate signature (MTA-OTIBAS). Further, we gave a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme. We first recall the notion of MTA-OTIBAS; we then recall its formal definition and the concrete scheme proposed in [3] . Then, we give the detailed security proof of MTA-OTIBAS (not given in [3] ).
An MTA-OTIBAS scheme has the following features. Firstly, each user's public key is his identity, so no certificate is needed on the public key, which avoids the certificate management overhead. Secondly, a signer's private key (corresponding to an identity and a lower-level TA) is restricted to be used only once; after that, the signer's private key should be updated. Thirdly, the MTA-OTIBAS scheme also allows signature aggregation and fast verification, i.e., n signatures can be aggregated into a single short signature (even signatures generated by signers enrolled by different lower-level TAs), which greatly saves storage space, and can be verified simultaneously.
We recall the formal definition of MTA-OTIBAS in Section 2. In Section 3 we recall the concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme. Then in Section 4 we prove that our MTA-OTIBAS concrete scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the co-CDH problem assumption.
DEFINITION OF MTA-OTIBAS
An MTA-OTIBAS scheme consists of six algorithms, i.e., Root.Setup, LowLevel.Setup, Extract, Sign, Aggregate, and Verify. Root.Setup is run by the root TA to generate the global system parameters and system master key. LowLevel.Setup is an interactive protocol run between a lower-level TA and the root TA. It generates the secret key, public key and certificate of the lower-level TA. Extract takes as input a lower-level TA's secret key and a signer's identity, and outputs a private key for the signer. Sign takes as input a signer's identity, his private key, the certificate of the signer's corresponding lower-level TA and any message, and outputs a signature on the message. The signature is only valid under the signer's identity and the certificate of his corresponding lower-level TA. A restriction here is that a private key corresponding to a specific identity issued by a lower-level TA can be used only once. However, the same identity can be enrolled by different lower-level TAs. This implies that the corruption of a lower-level TA does not influence the signers enrolled by other lower-level TAs. Aggregate is used to aggregate n message-signature pairs generated by the Sign procedure into a single signature, i.e., an aggregate signature. Verify is used to check the validity of an aggregate signature. It takes as input n messages, the corresponding aggregate signature, n identities enrolled by l lower-level TAs, and outputs 1 or 0 to represent whether the aggregate signature is valid or not.
A CONCRETE MTA-OTIBAS SCHEME
Our MTA-OTIBAS scheme is realized using bilinear maps which are widely employed in identity-based cryptosystems. A mapê :
αβ for all α, β ∈ Z * q , where G 1 , G 2 are two cyclic groups of prime order q, G T is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order, g 1 is a generator of G 1 , and g 2 is a generator of G 2 . By exploiting bilinear maps, we implement our MTA-OTIBAS scheme.
Root.Setup: The root TA runs this algorithm to generate 2 the system parameters as follows:
. 2) Pick κ ∈ Z * q as its master secret key, and compute y = g κ 2 as its master public key.
LowerLevel.Setup: In an MTA-OTIBAS scheme, before a lower-level TA can recruit members, it must be enrolled by the root TA. The root TA may add the public information of a lower-level TA (e.g., identity and public key) to the system global parameters. Let the identity of a lower-level TA T i be ID Ti . T i picks κ i ∈ Z * q as its secret key and computes y i = g κi 2 as its public key. (ID Ti , y i ) are submitted to the root TA. On input (ID Ti , y i ), the root TA generates a certificate cert Ti which is signed using its master secret key. Finally, cert Ti is sent to T i .
Extract: Suppose a signer with identity ID j wants to join the system maintained by T i whose secret key is κ i . On input the signer's identity ID j , T i generates the private key for the signer as follows: Sign: To sign a message m k , a signer with identity ID j enrolled by T i and private key s j,i = (s j,i,0 , s j,i,1 )
The signer outputs σ k as the signature on m k .
Aggregate: This publicly computable algorithm aggregates n signatures into a single signature. Let an entity collect n message-signature pairs {(m 1 , σ 1 ), · · · , (m n , σ n )} signed by n users with corresponding identities
The message-signature pairs are divided into l sets corresponding to the l lower-level TAs. This algorithm outputs Ω as the resulting aggregate signature, where Ω = n i=1 σ i . Verify: To verify an aggregate signature Ω on mes-
.., ID n } enrolled by T 1 , · · · , T l respectively, the verifier performs the following steps: 
SECURITY PROOF
An MTA-OTIBAS scheme should be secure. Informally, an MTA-OTIBAS scheme is said to be secure if no polynomialtime attacker not requesting a private key of an entity enrolled by a lower-level TA can forge an aggregate signature that is valid (i.e., such that Verify outputs 1) corresponding to that entity enrolled by the lower-level TA.
In general, the security of an MTA-OTIBAS scheme is modeled via the following EUF-CMA (existential universal forgery under adaptive chosen-message attack) game [1] and takes place between a challenger CH and an adversary A. The game has the following three stages:
Initialize: CH runs the Root.Setup algorithm to obtain a master secret key and the system parameters. CH then sends the system parameters to A while keeping secret the master secret key.
Attack: A can perform a polynomially bounded number of the following types of queries in an adaptive manner.
• LowerLevel.Setup queries: A may ask CH to set up a lower-level TA. On input an identity ID Ti of a lowerlevel TA, CH generates the secret key and certificate of the lower-level TA.
• Corrupt.LowerLevel queries: A can request the secret key of a lower-level TA T i . On input ID Ti , CH outputs the corresponding secret key of T i .
• Extract queries: A can request the private key of an entity with identity ID j issued by a lower-level TA T i . On input (ID j , cert Ti ), CH outputs the corresponding private key of the entity.
• Sign queries: A can request an entity's signature on a message m k . On receiving a query on (m k , ID j , cert Ti ), CH generates a valid signature σ j on m k under (ID j , cert Ti ), and replies with σ j .
′ lower-level TAs with certificates from the set {cert * T1 , ..., cert * T l ′ }, a set of n messages {m * 1 , ..., m * n } and an aggregate signature σ * . For simplicity, we assume m * i corresponds to ID * i for i ∈ {1, ..., n}. A wins the above game, if all of the following conditions are satisfied: We can now define the security of an MTA-OTIBAS scheme in terms of the above game. Definition 1. An MTA-OTIBAS scheme is secure, i.e., secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosenmessage attack, iff the success probability of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above EUF-CMA game is negligible.
We next recall the co-CDH assumption on which the security of the signature scheme in Section 3 rests. Definition 2 (co-CDH Assumption). The co-CDH assumption in two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q equipped with bilinearity states that, given (g a
Regarding the security of our MTA-OTIBAS scheme, we have the following claim. Theorem 1. Assume an adversary A has an advantage ǫ in forging an MTA-OTIBAS scheme of Section 3 in an attack modeled by the above EUF-OTIBAS-CMA game, within a time spanτ ; the adversary can make at most q Hi times H i (·) (i = 0, 1) queries, q L times LowerLevel.Setup queries, q C times Corrupt.LowerLevel queries, q E times Extract queries, q S times Sign queries. Then the challenger can solve the co-CDH problem with probability ǫ ′ ≥ 4 e 2 (qC +qE +qS +n+2) 2 ǫ within timê
, where τ G1 is the time to compute a point exponentiation in G 1 and n is the size of the aggregating set.
Proof: Let CH be a co-CDH attacker who receives a co-CDH challenge instance (g A is an adversary who interacts with CH as modeled in the EUF-CMA game. We show how C can use A to break the co-CDH assumption.
, where y = g κ 2 , and κ is the master secret key; then Ψ is sent to A.
Attack: We consider the hash functions H 0 (·) and H 1 (·) as random oracles. A can perform the following types of queries in an adaptive manner.
This list is initially empty. Whenever CH receives an H 1 query on (ID i , j) (where j = 0 or 1), CH does the following:
• If ID i exists in a previous query, find (ID i , α i,0 , α
and return id i,j .
• Else, first flip a coin coin i ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability 1 − δ. Then do:
Return id i,j as the answer. LowerLevel.Setup queries: CH maintains a list T A list of tuples (ID Ti , κ i , y i , cert Ti , coin Ti ). On input an identity ID Ti of a lower-level TA, CH does the following:
list , return cert Ti as the answer.
• Else, choose κ i ∈ Z * q , flip a coin coin Ti ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability 1 − δ and do the following: • Else, submit (ID i , 0) to H 0 and recover the tuple (ID i , α i,0 , α
list , flip a coin coin ′ i ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability 1 − δ. Then do the following:
and return
and return h i as the answer.
Corrupt.LowerLevel queries:
On input an identity ID Ti of a lower-level TA, CH first makes a LowerLevel.Setup query on ID Ti , and recovers the tuple (ID Ti , κ i , y i , cert Ti , coin Ti ) on T A list . If coin Ti = 0, CH returns κ i as the answer; otherwise, C aborts. Extract queries: When A issues an Extract query on (ID i , cert Ti ), the same answer will be given if the request has been asked before. Otherwise, CH recovers 
)).
Sign queries: On receiving a Sign query on (ID i , m i , cert Ti ), CH first queries H 0 (ID i , j) (j = 0 or 1), LowerLevel.Setup(ID Ti ) and H 1 (ID i , m i , cert Ti ) if they were not queried before, then recovers
Finally CH generates the signature as follows:
).
•
• Else, use the Sign algorithm to generate the signature, since the corresponding private key is known to CH.
Note that, as defined in our security assumptions, an adversary can only get one signature corresponding to the target identity and lower-level TA. Hence, CH aborts if coin i = coin Ti = 1, coin For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, j ∈ {1, ..., Without loss of generality, we assume i = j = 1. Besides, it is required that for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, coin * i = 0. In addition, the forged aggregate signature must satisfŷ
Since the forged aggregate signature must satisfŷ
, we have
) .
To complete the proof, we shall show that CH solves the given instance of the co-CDH problem with probability at least ǫ
′ . First, we analyze the three events needed for C to succeed:
• Σ1: CH does not abort as a result of any of A's Corrupt.LowerLevel, Extract and Sign queries.
• Σ2: A generates a valid and nontrivial aggregate signature forgery. Claim 1. The probability that CH does not abort as a result of A's Corrupt.LowerLevel, Extract and Sign queries is at least (1 − δ) qC +qE +qS . Hence we have Pr[Σ1] ≥ (1 − δ) qC +qE +qS . Proof: For a Corrupt.LowerLevel query, CH will abort iff coin Ti = 1. It is easy to see that the probability that CH does not abort is 1 − δ. Since A can make at most q C times Corrupt.LowerLevel queries, the probability that CH does not abort as a result of A's Corrupt.LowerLevel queries is at least (1 − δ) qC . For an Extract query, CH will abort iff coin i = coin Ti = 1. It is easy to see that the probability that CH does not abort for an Extract query is 1 − δ 2 > 1 − δ. Since A can make at most q E times Extract queries, the probability that CH does not abort as a result of A's Extract queries is at least (1 − δ) qE . When CH receives a Sign query, he will abort iff coin i = coin Ti = 1, coin ′ i = 0 happen. So for a Sign query, the probability that CH does not abort is 1 − δ 2 (1 − δ) > 1 − δ. Since A makes at most q S times Sign queries, the probability that CH does not abort as a result of A's Sign queries is at least (1 − δ) qS . Overall, we have Pr In total, we have ǫ
qC +qE +qS δ 2 (1 − δ) n ǫ ≥ 4 e 2 (qC +qE +qS +n+2) 2 ǫ, where e is Euler's constant.
CONCLUSION
We have proven that our MTA-OTIBAS concrete scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the co-CDH problem assumption.
